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Abstract 
Intervention operations are used by governments to manage their exchange rates but 
officials rarely confirm their presence in the market, leading inevitably to erroneous 
reports in the financial press.  There are also reports of what we term, unrequited 
interventions, interventions that the market expects but do not materialize. In this paper 
we examine the effects of various types of intervention news on intra-day exchange rate 
behavior. We find that unrequited interventions have a statistically significant influence 
on returns, volatility and order flow, suggesting that the expectation of intervention, even 
when governments do not intervene, can affect currency values. 
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Economic Research. 1.  Introduction 
 
  This paper examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to news of 
actual and unrequited interventions reported in the financial press.  Intervention 
operations are used by many governments to manage their exchange rates.  Research has 
found that these operations can, under certain circumstances, effectively influence the 
level and volatility of exchange rates.
1   One of the more puzzling aspects of intervention 
policy is the fact that some governments keep their intervention operations secret, even 
ex post.
2  The financial press often reports when a central bank is intervening over the 
wire services, though governments rarely officially confirm their presence in the market.  
Because there is often uncertainty in the market about whether a given government is 
intervening, there are inevitably circumstances when the financial press reports 
interventions that have not occurred.  There are also frequently reports of what we term, 
unrequited interventions, interventions that the market expects but do not materialize. In 
this paper we examine the effects of various types of intervention news (reported actual 
interventions, falsely reported interventions, oral interventions and unrequited 
interventions) on exchange rate behavior. 
                                                 
1 A number of recent papers have examined the influence of intervention operations on daily exchange rate 
returns and volatility and generally find evidence that interventions influence returns and increase 
volatility.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b), Dominguez (2003b), Humpage (1999), Fatum and Hutchison 
(2003, 2006), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003), and Ito (2003) find that interventions influence daily 
returns.  Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998), Galati et al. (2005), and Frenkel et al. (2005) 
find that interventions lead to increases in implied volatilities measured using options data. Chaboud and 
LeBaron (2001) find a positive correlation between daily (futures) trading volume and Fed interventions. 
Dominguez (1998) using a GARCH model, Beine et al. (2002) using a FIGARCH model, and Beine and 
Laurent (2003) using a model that allows for a time-varying jump probability associated with interventions, 
all find evidence that interventions tend to increase exchange rate volatility. Dominguez (2006) and Beine 
et al. (2003b) examine the effects of G3 interventions on daily realized volatility using an ARFIMA model.  
A few papers find evidence that situation-specific interventions lead to decreases in volatility.  For 
example, Beine et al. (2003a) allow for a regime-dependent specification using a Markov switching model 
and find that when the market is highly volatile concerted interventions decrease volatility.  Dominguez 
(1998) and Taylor (2004) find that interventions in the mid-1980s reduced exchange rate volatility. 
2 Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) discuss the possible reasons that central banks might want to keep their 
intervention operations secret (the so-called stealth operations).  Neely (2000) notes that central banks are 
moving increasingly toward electronic trading methods, which suggests that they are less interested in keeping 
operations secret. On this topic also see: Vitale (1999), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Chiu (2003), Beine 
et al. (2004) and Beine and Bernal (forthcoming). Although the Japanese government generally does not 
provide contemporaneous information about their intervention operations, the Ministry of Finance 
publishes lagged daily intervention data (lagged one month) on their website: 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm. 
  1  A number of previous studies have shown that in order to find significant 
reactions in the foreign exchange market to the news, one needs to measure the precise 
impact of the news at the intra-day level.
3  Using Reuters’ time-stamped newswire 
reports we are able to match the timing of intervention news to movements in intra-day 
exchange rates.  We also include scheduled macro announcement news reports which 
have been used in previous studies to allow us to compare the effects of intervention 
news against these more “traditional” variables.    
The intra-day foreign exchange data used in this study are transactions prices and 
quote spreads in three dollar currency markets: usd-gbp, usd-eur and yen-usd available 
from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system over the period from December 1999 
through July 2000.  The data do not include information on traded quantities, but they do 
indicate whether trades were initiated by a buyer or seller, allowing us to measure order 
flow as well as returns and volatility.  We use a 20 minute sampling frequency and 
measure order flow as the cumulative number of buyer initiated trades minus the 
cumulative number of seller initiated trades over the same 20 minutes. 
The intra-day intervention news and exchange rate data allow us to test whether 
interventions have similar impact effects on returns and volatility as compared to (the 
already heavily studied) scheduled macro announcements.  The fact that information 
regarding interventions most often comes from unofficial sources suggests that there are 
likely to be differences of opinion among market participants about the implications of 
the information.  In our application, we can distinguish between scheduled (and 
presumably better-understood) macro announcements and more ambiguous intervention 
news.  We also measure what proportion of the price discovery process in reaction to 
intervention news occurs via order flow.  Previous studies have found evidence that a 
substantial proportion of the market reaction to macro-announcements occurs via order 
flow.  By examining how intervention news events influence order flow – we can begin 
to better understand how this measure relates to price and volatility movements in the 
foreign exchange markets. 
                                                 
3 See Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the intra-day influence of news on 
exchange rates. 
  2The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the links between 
intervention operations and exchange rates in standard models. Section 3 describes the 
exchange rate and order flow data from Reuters D2000-2 used in our empirical analysis.  
Section 4 provides results of our event study analysis of the influence of intervention 
news and macro surprises on exchange rate returns and volatility.  Section 5 introduces 
our order flow information and examines its role in explaining exchange rate movements.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Intervention News and Exchange Rates 
Theory suggests that foreign exchange market interventions that are sterilized
4 
may influence exchange rates through two potential channels: portfolio balance and 
“information/signaling”. In portfolio-balance models of exchange rate determination 
investors diversify their holdings among domestic and foreign assets as a function of 
expected returns and the variance of returns. Foreign and domestic assets are assumed to 
be outside assets (so that Ricardian equivalence does not hold) and imperfect substitutes 
(so that uncovered interest parity does not hold). Portfolio balance theory predicts that the 
change in the relative supply of foreign and domestic assets that occurs with a sterilized 
intervention will require a change in expected relative returns. For example, after a 
sterilized home-currency supporting intervention, investors will require a higher expected 
return on foreign assets to hold willingly the larger outstanding stock, leading to a 
depreciation of the foreign currency relative to the home currency. In the portfolio 
balance model, traders do not need to observe the intervention operation in order for it to 
be effective.  However, only actual intervention operations, which change the 
composition of domestic relative to foreign assets in trader’s portfolios, can influence 
exchange rates via this channel.  Consequently, unrequited interventions (as well as false 
                                                 
4 Sterilized interventions are a combination of two transactions.  The central bank conducts a non-sterilized 
intervention, for example, by purchasing (or selling) foreign-currency denominated bonds and increasing 
(decreasing) the home monetary base. The central bank then sterilizes the operation by selling (or 
purchasing) a corresponding quantity of home-currency denominated bonds in order to reverse the effects 
on the monetary base. Countries that adhere to monetary or inflation targets are generally assumed to 
engage chiefly in sterilized intervention operations. In practice the U.S. and the ECB claim to routinely 
sterilize their operations. 
  3reports of interventions and oral interventions) should have no influence on exchange 
rates via the portfolio balance channel. 
The second channel whereby intervention operations may influence exchange 
rates is the information or signaling channel.  Intervention operations may provide 
investors with “information” about the Central Bank’s (or Government’s) view of the 
appropriate exchange rate.
5 Intervention operations may also provide a “signal” of future 
policy intentions (for example, future monetary policy).  Moreover, the intervention 
operation may itself “buy credibility” for future policy intentions. As long as the 
information signaled through intervention policy is relevant and credible, it can 
potentially influence the exchange rate.
6 Only those intervention operations that are 
observed by the market can serve to influence exchange rates via the signaling channel so 
that non-reported or secret interventions (if they are truly secret) are unlikely to serve as 
signals. 
When traders first learn of an intervention operation over the newswires, they 
may not know whether the information is substantiated or not.  It is therefore possible for 
all intervention news (whether actual, false or unrequited) to have a short-term impact on 
exchange rates via the signaling channel.
 7 As soon as traders learn that intervention news 
is false or unrequited then we might expect returns and volatility to revert to their original 
levels.  Alternatively, it may be that in periods when interventions are expected (even if 
they do not occur) that unrequited interventions reported over the newswires serve to 
coordinate the markets’ view of exchange rate movements.
8  
                                                 
5 It is also possible for governments to communicate this information directly to the market.  See, for 
example, Fratzcher (2004), Jansen and DeHaan (2005) and Sager and Taylor (2004). 
6 See Mussa (1981), Dominguez (1992), Vitale (2003),  Sarno and Taylor (2001), D’Souza (2002) and 
Taylor (2005) for further discussion of the intervention-signaling hypothesis. 
7 Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) hypothesize that interventions create significant adverse selection 
problems for dealers.  They find evidence in daily data that dealers increase exchange rate spreads around 
interventions and suggest that in doing so they protect themselves against the greater informational asymmetry 
around interventions. 
8 Montgomery and Popper (2001) suggest that actual central bank intervention may also serve to aggregate 
and disseminate traders’ information and thereby serve an informational sharing role for a heterogeneously 
informed market 
  4We use time-stamped Reuters’s newswire reports
9 to measure intervention news. 
Our search criteria retrieved newswire articles under the joint subject area of “foreign 
exchange” and “intervention”. We then coded and grouped
10 news articles according to 
geographic region (Euro-zone, U.K., U.S. or Japan) and type of intervention news.  Table 
1 provides a breakdown of the intervention news categories that appeared in newswire 
reports over the period under study. In the table we distinguish between cases where there 
was a ‘threat’ or ‘no threat’ of intervention from the policymaker.  Further distinctions 
were made between interventions that were ‘reported’ or ‘not reported’ in the news 
(panel a), and interventions that were ‘expected’ or ‘not expected’ by the market (panel 
b).  
There were 172 newswire reports that we classified as ‘threats’; these included 
reports of interventions, threats of intervention, and statements that were intended to 
influence the home currency (sub-classified as oral interventions). Examples of this 
category of intervention news include: 
“The beleaguered euro got a boost overnight when French Finance Minister 
Laurent Fabius reminded markets that currency market intervention was a weapon 
in Europe's arsenal and the currency should rise in the coming weeks” (May 9, 
2000). 
 “Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said Japan would act in response to 
rapid moves in the foreign exchange market” (March 14, 2000). 
 
There were 48 newswire reports that we classified as ‘No Threat’ interventions, defined 
as news that a central bank did not intend to intervene; examples include: 
”ECB President Wim Duisenberg says the ECB could not and should not do 
anything directly to influence the euro's exchange rate but said he would not 
fundamentally rule out intervention. Asked whether there was a floor set at which 
the ECB would defend the euro at all costs, Duisenberg said, ‘If there were such a 
limit, I wouldn't tell you. But there isn't one. But we know how limited the effect 
                                                 
9 These data are from the Factiva database and, unfortunately, do not include the headline news that run 
over the Reuters ticker second by second, but they include the major economic news events that occur over 
a given day.  Chang (2006) finds evidence that newswires and print media are often inaccurate in terms of 
substance (missing interventions as well as falsely reporting interventions), and Fischer (2006) finds 
evidence that the timing of newswire reports of SNB interventions often differ substantially from the 
official timing of interventions.  Newswire reports, however flawed, are one of the main sources of 
information for traders and dealers in the forex market, and are the only source of timed intra-day news 
available to researchers. 
10 In theory each “news” report may have a different one-time influence on exchange rates.  We group 
similar news items together in order to examine whether certain “types” of intervention news have a 
systematic influence on exchange rate behavior.   
  5of such intervention is. If we take such a step in coordination with the United 
States and Japan, then that would be a possibility. But we see no reason for it at 
present’” (February 17, 2000). 
 
“Bundesbank's Welteke says he doesn't believe short-term measures can stabilise 
euro's exchange rate” (March 6, 2000). 
 
‘Detected interventions’ refer to cases where newswires correctly reported that a central 
bank intervened. The one ‘false intervention’ refers to a newswire that incorrectly stated 
that the ECB was intervening. The largest category of intervention news, termed 
‘unrequited interventions’, includes 292 newswire reports that indicated that the market 
expected an intervention that did not occur; examples include: 
 
“The authorities have to show their hand. They have to stand up and be seen. I 
think the market will take their lead,” Soros said in London (May 5, 2000).  
 
“Actions speak louder than words, and it is all very well saying that you want the 
currency to be higher but people are actually waiting to see intervention, said Paul 
Coughlin, chief trader at American Express Bank in London” (May 11, 2000). 
 
The euro officially came into existence in January 1999, and a year later there was 
broad concern in Europe that the euro had dipped below parity against the dollar.  The 
majority of the unrequited intervention news reports in our data over this period were 
associated with the absence of ECB operations to support the euro against the dollar.  It 
was not until September 2000 (beyond our sample period) that the ECB actually 
intervened (in coordination with a number of other central banks including the Fed, the 
BOJ and the BOE).  
The Japanese government, in contrast to the Europeans, sought a depreciation of 
the yen relative to the dollar in this time period.  Figure 1, which shows the yen-usd 
exchange rate and BOJ interventions from 1990 though 2002, puts Japanese exchange 
rate objectives into context. After a number of years of yen depreciation relative to the 
dollar, the yen began to strengthen in August 1998 (on the heels of a number of 
interventions in support of the yen by the BOJ and the Fed)
11 with a precipitous rise in 
                                                 
11 Ito (2003) provides a chronological description of Japanese foreign exchange intervention over the period 
1991 through 2004.  He notes that Japanese intervention strategy changed dramatically in 1995 under 
  6the value of the yen relative to the dollar starting in July 1999 through early 2000. The 
BOJ intervened to weaken the yen by selling yen and purchasing dollars on 17 days over 
the period January 1999 (with the yen-usd rate at 108) through April 2000 (with the yen-
usd rate at 104).  Our eight-month sample period (circled on Figure 1) includes the last 5 
of these 17 intervention days.
12  Newswire reports over this period suggest that both the 
market and the Japanese government considered the yen-usd “100” mark as a critical 
value not to be crossed (which indeed did not happen). The first BOJ intervention in our 
sample occurred on December 24, 1999, a day when our Reuters electronic brokerage 
data (and the Reuters newswire data) suggests there was extremely little trading in 
advance of the Christmas holiday.  The second intervention, on January 4, 2000, also 
occurred during a period of extremely light trading volume.  The yen-usd rate rebounded 
from the critical “100” level after these interventions for a few weeks and then as the yen 
began to depreciate in early March, the BOJ again intervened on March 8th, 15th and 
April 3rd.  The yen-usd rate rebounded over the next few months and it was not until 
after a year’s hiatus that the BOJ again began to purchase dollars in September 2001 
through June 2002.  Along with the actual BOJ interventions that took place during this 
time, there were numerous unrequited intervention news reports of additional Japanese 
operations (which did not occur) to weaken the yen.  
During our sample period the Bank of England (BOE) did not engage in any 
actual intervention operations, though newswire reports indicate BOE concern over the 
strength of the pound (and its impact on the competitiveness of UK exports), as well as 
statements regarding the costs and benefits of joining the euro-zone.  We include the usd-
gbp in our analysis in large part because the source of our exchange rate data, the Reuters 
D2000-2 electronic brokerage trading system, is most dominate in this market.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Eisuke Sakakibara, the Director General of the International Bureau, toward larger sized interventions on 
fewer occasions.  Sakakibara retired in July 1999 but his successor, Mr. Kuroda, who was in charge of 
Japanese intervention policy during our sample period, followed a similar intervention philosophy of 
infrequent, large and unpredictable operations.  Also see Chaboud and Humpage (2005), Kim 
(forthcoming), Fatum and Hutchison (2006) and Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2005) for further 
analysis of Japanese interventions over this time period. 
12 Newswire reports suggest that the BOJ intervened on multiple occasions on each “intervention day”.  
The Fed, Bundesbank, and ECB also generally follow a strategy of intervening on multiple occasions over 
the course of a given intervention day.  See Dominguez (2003a) for more discussion of intra-day 
intervention operation strategies. 
  7The empirical approach we take in this paper is based on the assumption that 
exchange rates are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the market’s 
expectation of future fundamentals.   We further assume that “future fundamentals” may 
include both standard variables from international macro models (for example, money 
and income differentials) as well as variables such as actual and unrequited interventions 
that may provide information about future fundamentals.   We use intra-daily exchange 
rate data to allow a narrow enough window around the times of news announcements to 
be able to precisely estimate the exchange rate reactions in the spirit of  Anderson, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003)
13. 
We examine the intra-daily influence of intervention news on exchange rate 
movements.
14 We also consider whether intervention news not only impacts exchange 
rates directly, but also influences exchange rates via order flow (signed trade volume).  
Like unrequited interventions, order flow plays no role in standard models of exchange 
rate determination, so a finding that order flow matters will provide evidence in favor of a 
different modeling strategy for exchange rate determination (at least for very short term 
movements).
15
  The information that market participants in foreign exchange markets receive can 
be broadly categorized into two types: “scheduled” and “non-scheduled”. Official macro 
data are typically announced by the relevant government agency on a pre-arranged 
schedule, so that market participants can plan in advance their reactions to this 
information.  Table 2 describes the scheduled macro news announcements from the UK, 
the US, the Euro-area and Japan that are included in our “macro surprise” variables. Non-
scheduled news is by its nature less likely to be anticipated by the market. It is also likely 
                                                 
13 The enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily exchange rates includes 
Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee (1995), DeGennaro and Shrieves 
(1997), Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Bauwens et al. (2005), 
Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu and Wright (2004), Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003), 
Love (2004), Love and Payne (2003), Melvin and Yin (2000), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005). 
14 Bauwens et al. (2005) examine the influence of news, including rumors of intervention, on euro-usd 
volatility over a six month period in 2001.  They find that the most significant pre-announcement increase 
in volatility is related to rumors of central bank interventions. They also find that once a rumor is refuted, 
volatility stabilizes or drops. Other intra-day studies of the effects of (actual) intervention operations 
include: Goodhart and Hesse (1993), Peiers (1997), Chang and Taylor (1998), Beattie and Fillion (1999), 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Neely (2002), Payne and Vitale (2003), Breedon and Vitale (2004), Panthaki 
(2005), Pasquariello (2004, forthcoming), and Dominguez (2003a, 2006). 
15 Evans and Lyons (2002) is one of the first studies that found a link between order flow and exchange rate 
movements. We will be examining these same links though with a very different data set and time period. 
  8that market participants are less able to quickly interpret the implications of non-
scheduled news.  All our categories of intervention news are non-scheduled, potentially 
leading to more heterogeneity in trader responses to this sort of news.
16 Further, 
regardless of whether news is scheduled or not, its influence on exchange rates may be 
related to the state of the market at the time of the news arrival.
17 News that arrives 
during periods of high uncertainty may have different effects on the exchange rate, than 
news that arrives in calmer periods.
18  
 
3.  Exchange Market Data 
Our intra-day exchange rate and order flow data cover an eight-month period, 
from December 1999 through July 2000 for the usd-gbp, the usd-euro, and the yen-usd.   
The data are from the brokered segment of the inter-dealer exchange rate market as 
captured by the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system.   Electronic brokers were first 
introduced in 1992 and since that time their market share has increased rapidly. In the 
early 1990s the inter-dealer market was split evenly between direct and voice-broker 
trading but by the late 1990s (the sample period used in this study) the two top electronic 
brokerage systems, Reuters and EBS, made up over 50 percent of the market. Reuters has 
the largest share of the usd-gbp market, while EBS has a much larger share of total 
trading in the usd-eur and yen-usd markets, potentially leading the Reuters data in these 
markets to be less representative.  Reuters usd-eur and yen-usd order flow data, in 
particular, may not well capture average trading behavior in these markets. Likewise, 
                                                 
16 Of course, an increase in market heterogeneity may also occur in reaction to scheduled announcements.  
Kondor (2005) shows that if traders display confirmatory bias, the release of public information may 
increase divergence in opinion.  The main insight is that sometimes (public) information implies something 
different when it is coupled with different (private) pieces of existing information.  Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2006) also model the influence of higher-order expectations in reaction to news.  
17 For example, Dominguez (2003a) shows that the influence of central bank interventions on exchange rate 
returns depends on the intra-day timing of intervention operations (whether they occur during heavy trading 
volume, or are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements) as well as whether the operations are 
coordinated with another central bank. Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) find that “news” has its greatest 
influence on intra-day exchange rate returns during periods of high market uncertainty (proxied by high 
volatility as measured by the absolute value of returns). 
18 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) find evidence that “bad” news in good times (economic 
expansions) have greater impacts than good news in good times, suggesting that good news in good times 
confirms beliefs but bad news in good times comes as more of a surprise.  Our short sample period will not 
allow us to test this hypothesis directly, though in future work we intend to test whether “confirming” 
versus “surprising” news about interventions has different effects. 
  9spreads in the usd-eur and yen-usd quotes are sometimes quite wide due to the relative 
lack of liquidity in these markets on the Reuters system. 
Inter-dealer brokering systems provide prices that are advertised to all subscribers 
(though the identity of the quoting dealer is only available once the quote is hit).  Dealers 
can submit a buy or sell quote or “hit” a quote of another dealer. Only the highest bid and 
lowest ask (the touch) are shown on the Reuters screen. The quantity available at each 
(best) bid and ask is also shown (which may involve more than one bank), and when a 
bid or ask is hit the quantities available at that price are adjusted if they dip below $10 
million. When multiple banks have entered the same bid or ask price, and the price is hit, 
offers are met on a first come basis (meaning that the dealer who first input the price gets 
the deal first and if more quantity is needed, the dealer that next submitted the same price 
fills the order, and so on).  All transactions are made at either the posted bid or ask. While 
dealers in individual banks will know their own customer order flow – they do not have 
access to information on customer orders of other banks.  One of the reasons that inter-
dealer brokerage systems have become so popular is that they provide an important 
source of real time information on both market quotes and overall market order flow.
 19  
The Reuters D2000-2 system classifies transactions as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, 
providing dealers with a real time proxy of signed trading volume.
20  We measure order 
flow in this study as the difference between the number of buyer-initiated trades and 
seller-initiated trades in each 20-minute interval. 
  The intra-day price series used in this study incorporates information from both 
transactions prices (actual trades) and (tradeable) bid and ask quotes submitted by dealers 
(but not hit).
21  We use tradeable quotes in addition to actual transactions prices to create 
a 20-minute price series for the usd-eur, usd-gbp and yen-usd rates that spans the period 
over which we have intervention news data.
22  We measure exchange rate returns as the 
                                                 
19 See Rime (2003) and Lyons (2001, chapter 3) for detailed descriptions of electronic trading systems. 
20 The dealer posting the quote is considered the non-initiating side.  Reuters does not provide information 
on the size of each trade. 
21 Tradeable quotes differ from indicative quotes, which have been used in a number of previous studies, in 
that they provide “firm” prices.  Indicative quotes provide market information for non-dealers. 
22 There are a periods of low liquidity on Reuters D2000-2 due to technical problems (the feed failing), 
holidays, and during Asian trading hours.  Some studies simply drop these time periods from the sample. 
Our approach is to interpolate a 20 minute time series (using a linear interpolation method) from all 
available quotes in order to fully span our “news” data set.  Reuters does not include weekend data so any 
news that arrives over a weekend is moved to the first 20-minute interval on the nearest Monday. The 
  10log difference in 20-minute (midpoint) prices.  Figure 2 shows average daily usd-eur, 
usd-gbp and yen-usd returns, order flow and news arrival (measured as the number of 
newswire articles in a given 20-min interval) over the 24-hour GMT time scale.  News 
arrival and order flow are fairly evenly spread over the day, and there is little evidence of 
trend in average returns. 
  We measure exchange rate volatility as the absolute value of the 20-minute 
returns. Figure 3 shows the average absolute return in each 20-minute interval over the 
24-hour GMT time scale for each of the exchange rates (the x-axis for the three 
currencies starts at midnight, which is approximately 12am GMT for usd-eur and usd-gbp 
and 3pm GMT for yen-usd).  The data confirm the seasonal pattern that is typically found 
in intra-day exchange rate volatility data which, in turn, largely reflects the opening and 
closing of the three main trading markets in Tokyo, Europe and New York.  In order to 
take the opening and closings of markets into account we de-seasonalize the volatility 
series using the Andersen and Bollerslev (1997ab, 1998) flexible fourier form (FFF) 
regression method which involves decomposing the demeaned i-minute exchange rate 
returns, into a daily volatility factor, a periodic component for the i
th intraday interval and 
an i.i.d. mean zero unit variance innovation term all divided by the square root of the 
number of uncorrelated intraday return components.
23  This estimated FFF seasonal is 
shown (together with the average daily volatility) in Figure 3.   
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our 20-minute exchange rates, returns
24 
and volatility as well as order flow, order flow volatility and transaction frequency 
(measured as the number of transactions in a given 20-min interval). The three exchange 
rate returns series display little autocorrelation, suggesting that future exchange rate 
changes cannot be predicted from past changes. Intra-day return volatility, order flow 
volatility, and transaction frequency for all three currencies shows evidence of strong and 
persistent autocorrelation. While buy and sell orders are highly autocorrelated, net order-
flow (buy orders minus sell orders) does not display significant autocorrelation.  Usd-gbp 
returns are significantly less variable than are usd-eur or yen-usd returns over this time 
                                                                                                                                                 
average number of newswire reports on Mondays (including weekend news) is 93 compared to 100 for 
Tuesdays, 123 for Wednesdays, 132 for Thursdays and 81 for Fridays. 
23 See Dominguez (2006) for a detailed description of how this was implemented. 
24 We compute returns (approximately) as the percentage change in the exchange rate multiplied by 100, so 
the units can be thought of as basis points. 
  11period and yen-usd transaction frequency is significantly lower (at 3 transactions every 
20 minutes) than is transaction frequency for usd-eur or usd-gbp (which have closer to 30 
transactions every 20 minutes). 
Table 4 presents contemporaneous correlations among our key variables: 
exchange rate returns, exchange rate volatility, order flow, order flow volatility, trading 
frequency and news arrival.
25  The correlations for all three currencies indicate that there 
exists a strong contemporaneous association between exchange rate returns and order 
flow, as well as between exchange rate volatility, order flow volatility and transaction 
frequency. The correlation between returns and order flow is highest for usd-eur (at .51) 
and lowest for yen-usd (at .224).  Beyond these contemporaneous correlations, we might 
expect longer-lived correlation between intervention news and the other variables if 
traders have different views of the implications (and information content) of the news. 
 
4.  Effects of Intervention News on Returns and Volatility 
The standard approach in the empirical exchange rate literature is to run the 
following sort of “event study” style regression
26 of the conditional mean of  i-minute 
exchange rate returns on j leads
27 and lags of the actual intervention indicator, each of the 




0 g ti j j ti j k j j ti j g ti g ti s  =    +   I N  +   s α αα α −− Δ∑ + ∑ ∑ Δ ∑ ε − +     (1) 
where  denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) exchange rate 
on day t, 
ti s Δ
I denotes the intervention indicator, and N denotes intervention news and macro 
surprises
28.  All news variables are time-stamped to the nearest i-minute. We use the 
                                                 
25 Evans and Lyons (2003) document strong contemporaneous correlation between news arrival, transaction 
frequency and order flow volatility.  Melvin and Yin (2000) find a positive correlation between trading 
frequency (using indicative quotes) and the rate of flow of public information. 
26 An alternative approach based on state dependent heteroscedasticity is used by Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
and Evans and Lyons (2003). 
27 We include leads and lags in order to take into account the possibility that the time-stamp on our news 
does not match the actual timing of when market participants first learn about the news.  We find evidence 
of both lead and lag effects for our intervention news variables for up to 2 hours before and after the 
Reuters’ time stamp. 
28 The intervention indicator and the intervention news variables are (0,1) dummy variables. Macro 
surprises are measured as the difference between the specific announcement and the ex-ante expectation of 
  12Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the lead/lag lengths, and we correct for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation in the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach. Using 
this general regression specification it is possible to test for the impact and intra-day effects 
of different kinds of intervention news and macro surprises on exchange rate returns by 
examining whether the  1, j α s and  2,
k
j α s are individually and jointly statistically significant.   
The coefficients in this context measure the typical effect of the k
th news announcement at 
time i (on day t) on exchange rate returns in the same (narrow) i-minute window.  It is 
worth noting that in order to be able to interpret the coefficients in this way we need to 
assume that the variables in the regression can be viewed as predetermined regressors over 
the i-minute period (which is less likely to be realistic for low-frequency data windows).  It 
is also the case that the coefficients will measure the linear combination of exchange rate 
return effects associated with the market’s assessment of both the news and how the news 
will influence the economy.
29
  Our “news” variable (N) includes five distinct categories of news: (1) macro 
surprises, (2) news about intervention policy from policy-makers, (3) news about 
intervention policy from the market, (4) news about policy-maker-market interactions, and 
(5) news about unrequited interventions (interventions that the market expected but did not 
occur).
 30  All our categories of intervention news are further broken down by geographic 
region (Euro-zone, Japan, UK or Joint).  Macro surprises are also disaggregated by 
country so that UK, US, Euro-area and Japanese surprises are included separately.
31
Table 5 presents results of our regression of intra-day (20-minute) usd-eur, usd-
gbp, and yen-usd returns on news.  The first, third and fifth columns in table 5 present the 
results of our benchmark regression, which include the actual Japanese interventions and 
                                                                                                                                                 
the announcement (based on the median response to a survey conducted by Money Market Services 
International) divided by the sample standard deviation of each announcement (this serves to normalize the 
surprises so that comparisons of the relative size of coefficients is feasible). 
29 For a nice discussion of the underlying assumptions in this sort of event study analysis see Faust, Rogers, 
Wang and Wright (2003) pages 6-9. 
30 We attempted to group news into variables in such a way as to insure that we would not be combining 
news that would be expected to lead to opposite effects on exchange rates. (This task was made easier for 
the fact that there were no major shifts in exchange rate objectives by the relevant governments over the 8-
month period under study.) The coefficients on these disaggregated news variables are then aggregated into 
broader groupings of variables in order to keep our tables readable.   Regression results with the 
disaggregated news categories are available upon request. 
31 As robustness checks we also included disaggregated macro surprises (by type and region).  Results were 
qualitatively similar whether surprises are included in aggregated or disaggregated form. 
  13the macro surprises as “news”, for each exchange rate.  Both leads and lags of the 
Japanese intervention indicator variable significantly influence yen-usd returns and 
lagged interventions influence usd-gbp returns.  Macro surprises are generally not found 
to be statistically significant, only Japanese macro surprises significantly influence usd-
eur returns.  Further, the relatively low regression goodness-of-fit for these benchmark 
regressions suggests that actual interventions and macro surprises account for a small 
fraction of the overall variability of returns for all three exchange rates.   
The second, fourth and sixth columns in table 5 include our intervention news 
variables in the lower panel.  For each intervention news category the reported coefficient 
is the sum of six leads and lags, corresponding to two hours before and after the 
newswire time-stamp. Statistical significance is based on two criteria.  The first is an 
exclusion restriction, where the null hypothesis is that all the leads and lags are zero 
(under the column labeled F-test).  The second is a Wald test of the null hypothesis that 
the sum of the leads and lags equals zero. This second test provides evidence on mean 
reversion.  For example, if there is an immediate influence of news on returns which is 
subsequently reversed (within the 4 hour window), the sum of the coefficients would be 
zero (or close to zero).  In many cases individual coefficient leads or lags were found to 
be statistically significant (leading to a significant F-stat), while the sum of the 
coefficients over the 4 hour lead/lag window was not always statistically different from 
zero (leading to an insignificant Wald test). 
The coefficient values and statistical (in)significance of the macro surprises in 
table 5 remain qualitatively unchanged with the inclusion of intervention news.  The 
coefficient on the Japanese intervention indicator variable remains significant especially 
in the yen-usd regression, suggesting that these interventions led to a depreciation of the 
dollar relative to the yen (recall that the objective of the Japanese government in this 
period was to depreciate the yen).  Interestingly, the results suggest that all our categories 
of intervention news seem to have a qualitatively similar influence on returns.  For 
example, news that the ECB would not intervene led to a six-basis-point depreciation of 
the euro. Recall that, had the ECB intervened (which they did not) in this sample period, 
their objective would have been to appreciate, not depreciate, the euro. Likewise, market 
  14expectations of Japanese interventions led to a five-basis-point depreciation of the dollar 
in both the yen-usd and usd-gbp markets  
The regression results presented in table 5 indicate that actual interventions, 
threats of interventions, denials of interventions, and unrequited interventions all had an 
influence on intra-daily exchange rate returns in the usd-eur and yen-usd markets. 
However, the relatively low regression goodness-of-fit (for all specifications across all 
three exchange rates) suggests that intervention news does not go very far in explaining 
overall exchange rate movements. It is possible that our binary coding of intervention 
news is partly to blame for our inability to explain a larger fraction of exchange rate 
variation.  It may be that our news variables will be more successful at explaining 
exchange rates during periods when the market is more uncertain, or that intervention 
news influences volatility more than returns. It may also be that intervention news do not 
impact price directly, but that their influence is mediated through order flow.  We 
investigate these possibilities in the next three sets of regressions.  
In order to examine how intervention news influences traders under different 
market conditions, we test for two types of interaction effects.  First, we ask whether 
intervention news is more (or less) likely to influence returns during periods of high 
market uncertainty (proxied by high volatility).  We create an indicator variable that takes 
on the value 1 during 20-minute intervals when volatility (measured as the absolute value 
of returns) exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations.  The first three 
columns in table 6 present regression results that show that during periods when the 
market is most uncertain, intervention news (of all types) had a significantly larger 
influence on returns than was the case when news arrived during normal periods (while 
we include each intervention news variable separately as well as interacted with our 
“high volatility” indicator in the regression, we report only the sums of the leads and lags 
of the coefficients on the interacted terms in the table).  Second, we examine if 
intervention is more (or less) effective when lots of other news is hitting the market.  We 
create an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 20-minute intervals when the 
number of news reports exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations.
32  The 
                                                 
32 The “news report” variable is based on a broad interpretation of foreign exchange market news.  For 
more information about this variable see Dominguez and Panthaki (2006). 
  15coefficients in the last three columns of table 6 (again we report only the sums of the 
leads and lags of the coefficients on the intervention news variables interacted with the 
“high news arrival” indicator variable) indicate that intervention news often had a larger 
impact on returns when it arrived during heavy news periods.  In the usd-eur market, in 
particular, the Wald tests indicate that intervention news continued to influence returns 
beyond a four-hour window. These results suggest that intervention news is more likely 
to influence trader behavior during specific market conditions, especially during times of 
high uncertainty.  However, the regression goodness-of-fit measures remain relatively 
low indicating that intervention news explains a small fraction of overall variability of 
returns. 
In order to examine whether intervention news helps to explain the absolute value 
of exchange rate returns, we regress de-seasonalized
33 intra-day volatility, 
s
ti V , on the 
same set of explanatory variables: 
1, 2, 3,
sk k
0 g ti j j ti j k j j ti j g ti g ti V   =   +  I N  +  V
s λ λλ λ −− ∑+ ∑ ∑ ∑ η − +
                                                
    (2) 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) find that three factors influence intra-daily exchange rate 
volatility: calendar effects and volatility dependencies (both of which are captured in the 
FFF seasonal) and macro surprises, with macro surprises providing the least explanatory 
power.  We augment their specification with our intervention news variables and allow 
for a longer lag structure to test whether the effects of these (non-scheduled) news reports 
are longer-lived.  We use the Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the leads and lags in the 
regression specification and correct for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach.  
Table 7 presents our volatility regression results using the same column format as 
we did in table 5.   We again find that only Japanese macro surprises enter significantly in 
the usd-eur regression, providing suggestive evidence that scheduled news, perhaps 
because it is less ambiguous, has extremely short-lived (less than 20 minutes) influence 
on volatility.  The Japanese intervention indicator variable now significantly influences 
volatility for all three currencies.  We also find that all the different types of intervention 
 
33 It could be that the intra-day seasonal is explained by news arrival.  We test for this possibility by 
including our intervention news variables and macro surprises directly in the FFF regression and find no 
evidence of correlation between the daily seasonal and our news variables. 
  16news significantly influence volatility across all three currencies (the F-stats are 
consistently significant for all our news variables).
34  Interestingly intervention news 
often led to own-market increases in volatility but decreases in volatility in the other 
currency markets.  Very few of the Wald tests are significant in table 7 suggesting little 
evidence of a long-lived influence of news on volatility. 
 
5.  Does Intervention News Influence Order Flow? 
In standard models of exchange rate behavior when “positive” news arrives for a 
currency, demand for that currency rises, causing the relative value (the price) of the 
currency to rise.  In these models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to 
news because price is assumed to instantaneously reflect the news.  Trading volume may 
rise in reaction to news, but as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for 
these trades to be biased in favor of purchases or sales.  So that in standard models the 
arrival of “news” should be orthogonal to changes in order flow.
35
We use transaction frequency, TF, as a proxy for volume, and first test whether 




g ti j j ti j k j j ti j g ti g ti 0 TF   =   +  I N  +  TF γ γγ γ −− υ − ∑ +∑ ∑ + ∑                           (3) 
Table 8 presents the results of this regression.  We find strong evidence of a relationship 
between transaction frequency and both the Japanese intervention indicator variable and 
intervention news (but not macro surprises).  This suggests that when traders learn of 
interventions news (regardless of whether the news indicates that an intervention is likely 
or not) this influences their decision about whether to trade or not.  In some cases the 
coefficient sign on intervention news is negative suggesting transaction frequency fell in 
reaction to the news, though the signs on intervention news do not indicate any 
discernable patterns among the different sorts of news.  While our measures of regression 
                                                 
34 It is also worth noting that the regression goodness-of-fit is dramatically higher, due in part to the strong 
AR component of volatility. 
35 One view of the relationship between order flow and prices is that it is only a temporary phenomenon.  
Order flow in this context reflects trader “digestion effects” in reaction to news, so that once the news is 
fully “digested”, any order flow induced price effects will revert back.  Work by Evans and Lyons (2002) 
and Danielsson, Payne and Luo (2002), however, shows that order flow continues to explain changes in 
foreign exchange returns well after 24 hours, suggesting either that digestion is very slow, or more likely, 
that the influence of order flow on prices is not temporary. 
  17goodness-of-fit in table 8 are quite high, this is largely due to the strong autoregressive 
nature of transaction frequency.  
Under what circumstance might intervention news cause a change not just in 
volume, but in order flow? One reason that price might not immediately (or fully) react is 
if the intervention news either is not common knowledge, or if different market 
participants interpret the news differently. Unrequited intervention operations are likely 
to be good examples of news that evoke heterogeneous reactions.  In this case, order flow 
might convey this information to the market (rather than price).  Further, if underlying 
demand for currencies is driven not by news per se, but by changes in risk aversion or 
hedging technologies, again it might be order flow that will convey this information to 
the market.
36
A simple linear regression specification that relates foreign exchange returns to 
order flow is: 
  1, 2, g ti j j ti j g ti g ti 0 s  =    +   O F   s ββ μ β −− Δ∑ + Δ ∑ +
                                                
 (4) 
Table 9 presents results for a regression of returns on contemporaneous and lagged order 
flow (OF). The first thing to note in the table is that our measure of regression goodness-
of-fit differs significantly across the three currencies.  Our estimates suggest that order 
flow explains over 14% of the variation in 20-minute usd-gbp returns, 6% of yen-usd 
returns, and only 2.8% of usd-eur returns. These differences are likely due in large part to 
the fact that the Reuters D2000 system dominates in the sterling market but only captures 
a small fraction of trades in either the euro or yen markets.
37  The coefficient on 
contemporaneous order flow is statistically significant and positively associated with 
returns for all three currencies, suggesting that the influence of news is not fully captured 
in price changes and that order flow may play a role in the price discovery process. 
 
36 Four recent papers that have studied the link between “news” and order flow include: Love (2004), Love 
and Payne (2003), Melvin and Yin (2000), Evans and Lyons (2003), and Dominguez and Panthaki (2006).  
Breedon and Vitale (2004) find that the strong contemporaneous correlation between order flow and 
exchange rates is mostly due to liquidity (and not information) effects. 
37 The fact that Reuters has incomplete market share in these currencies suggests that Reuters’ order flow 
measures total order flow with error.  This in turn suggests that the relationship between order flow and 
returns is measured with error in the usd-eur and yen-usd regressions, leading coefficients to be biased 
toward zero.  This sort of measurement error is less of a concern in the usd-gbp regression because Reuters 
is dominant in that market. 
  18Our results so far suggest that intervention news influences exchange rate returns, 
volatility, and transaction frequency and that order flow influences returns.  The next 
question to ask is what drives order flow?  Previous studies have found a link between 
macro surprises and order flow, which runs counter to standard models that would 
suggest that common knowledge news, such as macro surprises, should be instantly 
incorporated in price.  We test whether this result also holds for our data sample, and 
whether intervention news is also linked to order flow, OF. 
  1, 2, 3,
kk
g ti j j ti j k j j ti j g ti g ti 0 OF   =   +  I N  +  OF ϕ ϕϕ ϕ −− ∑+ ∑ ∑ ∑ ξ − +
                                                
   (5) 
Table 10 presents results for the regression of order flow on the Japanese 
intervention indicator, macro surprises, intervention news, and past order flow. The first, 
third and fifth columns provide results for our benchmark specification which only 
includes the Japanese intervention indicator and macro surprises.  Again, only the 
Japanese macro surprises are statistically significant in the usd-eur regression, while 
actual Japanese interventions enter statistically significantly in all three currency markets.  
The results in the second, fourth, and sixth columns of table 10 indicate that the 
intervention indicator variable is no longer significant when we include the other 
intervention news variables in the regression specification.  Interestingly it is in the yen-
usd market, where Reuters’ has limited market share, that we find the intervention news 
variables have the most influence.  However, the regression goodness of fit never rises 
above .026 suggesting that order flow is largely not being driven by these variables.
38  
The coefficient signs on intervention news in these regressions are generally consistent 
with what we found earlier in the returns regressions.   Coefficient signs on Japanese 
intervention news are generally negative suggesting that this news led buy orders for 
dollars to fall relative to sell orders.  Likewise, the coefficient signs on ECB intervention 
news are generally positive suggesting that this news led buy orders for dollars to rise 
relative to sell orders. 
 
38 This result is at odds with results in Evans and Lyons (2004) which find a strong connection between 
disaggregated order flow and news.  It is possible that the difference in results is due to the fact that our 
order flow information is only reflecting inter-dealer trades. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we examine whether actual and unrequited intervention news 
influences exchange rates.  Previous studies have found that scheduled macro 
announcements, when measured in surprise form, help to explain intra-daily exchange 
rate behavior. Likewise, official interventions by governments in the foreign exchange 
market have been found to influence intra-day (and daily) returns and volatility.  Results 
in this paper indicate that unrequited intervention news (and even news of “no 
intervention”) has a statistically significant influence on both intra-day exchange rate 
returns and volatility, suggesting that the expectation of intervention, even when 
governments do not intervene, can affect currency values.  These results provide strong 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that interventions influence exchange rates via the 
information/signaling channel. 
  We also examine the role of order flow in exchange rate determination.  In 
standard models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to news because price 
is assumed to instantaneously adjust.  Trading volume may rise in reaction to news, but 
as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for trades to be biased in favor of 
purchases or sales.  We find evidence that order flow has some explanatory power 
suggesting that prices are, at the very least, slow to adjust. At the same time, we find that 
actual interventions and our various categories of intervention news explain a very small 
fraction of the variation in order flow.  Overall, our results indicate that along with actual 
interventions, other kinds of intervention news (including denials of intervention and 
unrequited interventions) and order flow matter. We do not find evidence that macro 
surprises have much influence on intra-day returns, volatility or order flow over our 
sample period.  These results suggest that future models of exchange rate determination 
ought include a broader conception of price relevant “news”. 
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Dec 99 - July 00
 
 
Notes:  Left-hand scale shows the daily yen-usd exchange rate and right-hand scale 
shows daily Japanese interventions (in millions of dollars) from 1990-2002.  Daily 
Japanese intervention data is available at: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm.  Our 
eight month sample period (circled in the figure) includes five Japanese intervention 
days. 
 
  27Figure 2: Average Daily Returns, Order Flow and News Arrival
YEN-USD
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are sampled at 20-minute frequency.  
Currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign currency 
per dollar for the yen.  The figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of returns, order flow and news arrival over a 24-hour 
period.  Returns are calculated as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the 
average of the bid and ask quotes.  Order flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in 
which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and US dollar 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  283a. USD-EUR
3b. USD-GBP
3c. YEN-USD
Figure 3: Average Daily Volatility and FFF Seasonal
(in basis points)
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000 and 
are sampled at 20-minute frequency.  Currencies are defined as the number of dollars 
per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign currency per 
dollar for the yen.  The figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of volatility (jagged 
line) and the Flexible Fourier Form seasonal (smooth line) over a 24-hour period.  Each 
24-hour day starts at midnight, which is 12am GMT for USD-EUR and USD-GBP and 
3pm GMT for YEN-USD.  Volatility is defined as the absolute return, where returns 
are calculated as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote.  The mid quote is 






















































































































































































  29Reported Not Reported
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Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000.
(1) 38 for the Euro-zone, 134 for Japan, 6 joint; (2) the Japanese conducted
interventions on 5 days in support of the dollar, all were reported by Reuters; (3)
26 for the Euro-zone, 1 for Japan, I for UK, and 20 joint; (4) there was one false
(ECB) intervention; (5) 215 unrequited actual interventions ((Euro-zone: 76,















(a) Intervention and News
(b) Interventions and Market Expectations
 
  30Announcement Reported as Local time
UK Announcements (total = 80)
RPIX Y/Y % change 08:30 GMT
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Global trade GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
Provisional M4 M/M % change 08:30 GMT
PPI M/M % change NSA 08:30 GMT
Industrial Production M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Unemployment thousands 08:30 GMT
Current Account GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
US Announcements (total = 80)
PPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
CPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
Industrial Production M/M % change 09:15 ET
Monthly M3 change $ Bln 16:30 ET
Goods & Services Trade Balance USD (billion) 08:30 ET
Civilian Unemployment Rate percent 08:30 ET
Nonfarm Payrolls thousands 08:30 ET
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 ET
Euro Area Announcements (total = 58)
PPI M/M % change 11:00 GMT
Harmonised CPI M/M % change 11:00 GMT
Ind Production 3M/3M % change 11:00 GMT
M3 Y/Y % change 09:00 GMT
Trade ex-EMU prel. EUR EUR (billion) 11:00 GMT
Unemployment rate percent 11:00 GMT
Japanese Announcements (total = 122)
Current Account billions of Yen 23:50 GMT
Adjusted Merchandise Trade Balance billions of Yen 23:50 GMT
CPI M/M % change 23:00 GMT
CPI Tokyo M/M % change 23:00 GMT
Crude Oil Imports Y/Y % change 23:30 GMT
Domestic Wholesale Price Index 23:50 GMT
GDP Q/Q % change 23:50 GMT
Housing Starts Y/Y % change 05:00 GMT
Job-to-Applicant Ratio 23:00 GMT
Large Scale Retail Sales Y/Y % change 23:50 GMT
Machine Orders M/M % change 05:00 GMT
Merchandise Trade Balance Total billions of Yen 23:50 GMT
Money Supply Y/Y % change 23:50 GMT
Preliminary Industrial Production M/M % change 23:50 GMT
Tankan Survey Manufacturing 23:50 GMT
Tertiary Industry Index M/M % change 23:50 GMT
Unemployment Rate 23:00 GMT
Vehicle Sales Y/Y % change 00:00 GMT
Workers' Household Spending Y/Y % change 04:30 GMT
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Macro News Announcements
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000.  M/M% change refers to 
month-on-month percentage change.  3M/3M% change is three month-on-three month percentage change.  
Q/Q% change refers to quarter-on-quarter percentage change.  Y/Y% change is year-on-year percentage 
change.  NSA refers to non-seasonally adjusted.  22 GMT is 7am in Japan.  









Mean 0.97 0.00 5.55 0.27 1.14 30.36
Variance 0.04 9.99 8.30 13.04 1.73 52.13
Skewness 0.10 -0.13 2.93 0.53 2.04 2.30
Kurtosis 2.87 12.07 14.56 17.62 11.62 11.27
Autocorrelation lags
1 0.99 0.13 0.47 0.04 0.86 0.85
5 0.98 0.05 0.30 0.02 0.61 0.56
10 0.98 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.38 0.32










Mean 1.57 -0.03 2.06 0.42 1.07 28.02
Variance 0.05 2.88 2.01 7.88 1.17 41.51
Skewness -0.32 0.00 1.40 0.38 1.39 2.24
Kurtosis 1.83 5.01 7.92 11.40 5.09 9.37
Autocorrelation lags
1 1.00 0.01 0.36 0.04 0.80 0.79
5 1.00 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.56 0.49
10 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.35 0.27










Mean 106.29 0.01 7.01 0.06 0.26 2.83
Variance 2.28 14.06 12.19 2.98 0.36 4.96
Skewness -0.19 0.17 4.23 0.18 1.91 3.30
Kurtosis 3.15 21.82 26.83 20.46 8.45 20.50
Autocorrelation lags
1 0.98 0.07 0.49 0.15 0.66 0.66
5 0.95 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.47 0.43
10 0.93 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.32 0.27
20 0.91 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.11
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Returns, Volatility, Order Flow and 
Transaction Frequency
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are 
sampled at 20-minute frequency.  Currencies are defined as the number of dollars per 
foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign currency per dollar for 
the yen.  The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  Returns 
are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote.  Volatility is defined as the 
absolute return.  Order flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) 
refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency 
(euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and the US dollar for the YEN-USD).  Order 
flow volatility is the standard deviation of order flow and transaction frequency is the 
number of actual trades in each 20-minute period.  















Return 1 …………… … …
Volatility -0.011 1 … … … … … …
Total Buy Orders 0.108 0.321 1 … … … … …
Total Sell Orders -0.141 0.324 0.882 1 … … … …
Order Flow 0.511 0.011 0.292 -0.193 1 … … …
Order Flow Volatility -0.023 0.317 0.921 0.934 0.022 1 … …
Transaction Frequency -0.015 0.333 0.971 0.969 0.054 0.956 1 …
















Return 1 …………… … …
Volatility -0.033 1 … … … … … …
Total Buy Orders 0.050 0.397 1 … … … … …
Total Sell Orders -0.091 0.397 0.930 1 … … … …
Order Flow 0.376 0.013 0.222 -0.151 1 … … …
Order Flow Volatility -0.025 0.452 0.909 0.908 0.037 1 … …
Transaction Frequency -0.020 0.404 0.983 0.982 0.038 0.925 1 …
















Return 1 …………… … …
Volatility 0.014 1 … … … … … …
Total Buy Orders 0.120 0.180 1 … … … … …
Total Sell Orders -0.111 0.168 0.469 1 … … … …
Order Flow 0.224 0.016 0.533 -0.497 1 … … …
Order Flow Volatility 0.010 0.226 0.799 0.782 0.036 1 … …
Transaction Frequency 0.007 0.203 0.861 0.853 0.028 0.922 1 …
Reuters News -0.003 -0.008 -0.011 0.010 -0.020 0.003 -0.001 1
Table 4: Contemporaneous Correlations
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000 and are sampled at 20-
minute frequency.  Currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and 
sterling, and number of foreign currency per dollar for the yen.  Returns are defined as 100 times the log 
difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  
Volatility is defined as the absolute return.  Order flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a 
buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for 
USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and the US dollar for the YEN-USD).  Order flow volatility is the standard 
deviation of order flow and transaction frequency is the number of actual trades in each 20-minute period.  
Reuters News is the number of intervention news reports in each 20 minute period.
  33Independent Variables
Constant 0.0000  -0.0003   -0.0004  -0.0003   0.0003  0.0007  
Japanese Intervention Indicator
leads  2-6 0.0026   0.0021  -0.0031   -0.0038  -0.0001   -0.0213  
lead  1 -0.0030   0.0010  -0.0041   -0.0068  -0.0615 ** -0.0938 **
lag 0 -0.0014   -0.0245   0.0226   0.0191   -0.0394 * -0.0600 **
lag 1 0.0005   0.0034   -0.0075 * -0.0097 ** -0.0344   -0.0450 *
lags 2-6 0.0002   0.0008   0.0017   0.0011   -0.0368 * -0.0459 **
Lagged Dependent variable
lag 1 0.1205 *** 0.1116 *** 0.0147   0.0125   0.0626   0.0577  
lag 2 0.1014 *** 0.0946 *** 0.0084   0.0074   0.1217 *** 0.1172 ***
Macro Surprises
UK 0.0083   0.0072  0.0053   0.0049  0.0005   0.0000  
US -0.0117  -0.0115   0.0024  0.0024   -0.0067  -0.0065  
Euro-zone 0.0181  0.0160   0.0027  0.0026   -0.0162  -0.0177  










Oral Policy 0.0285 *** 0.0056 0.0992 ***
Intervention 0.0625 *** ** 0.0053 0.0041 ***
No intervenion -0.0676 *** * -0.0172 0.0076 ***
Japan
Oral Policy -0.2142 *** *** -0.0207 0.0846 ***
Intervention 0.0064 *** 0.0077 0.0355 ***
No intervenion -0.5935 *** *** -0.0514 0.0795 ***
UK
Oral Policy -0.1032 *** 0.0269 -0.0804 ***
Intervention 0.0403 *** -0.0599 -0.0273 ***
No intervenion -0.2720 *** … -0.3854 ***
Joint
Intervention 0.0513 *** *** -0.0039 0.1313 *** *
No intervenion -0.0391 *** -0.0001 -0.0360 ***
News about Market's Expectations
Euro-zone
Intervention 0.0239 *** -0.0574 0.0495 ***
No intervenion -0.0649 *** 0.0079 -0.0955 ***
Japan
Intervention 0.1148 *** 0.0569 * -0.5120 *** **
Joint
Intervention 0.0800 *** 0.0145 0.0885 ***
No intervenion -0.0832 *** *** 0.0016 0.0260 ***
News about Policymaker-Market Interactions
Euro-zone intervention denied 0.0021 *** … -0.5978 *** **
Market detects Japan intervention 0.0054 *** -0.0010 0.0054 ***
News about Unrequited Interventions
Euro-zone
Unrequited actual intervention -0.0008 *** 0.0069 ** -0.0035 ***
Unrequited oral intervention -0.0611 *** -0.0317 0.0651 ***
Japan
Unrequited actual intervention 0.0335 *** -0.0031 -0.0099 ***
Joint
Unrequited actual intervention -0.0266 *** -0.0027 -0.0336 ***
Unrequited oral intervention 0.0067 *** 0.0020 -0.0781 *** **
Rbar-squared 0.0275 0.0317 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0194 0.0178
F-test (all regressors) 35.91 *** 4.23 *** 0.97 1.03 25.06 *** 2.76 ***












Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the 
bid and ask quotes.  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  Significance for the upper panel of the table is based on the t-statistic. Coefficients 
for each "news" regressor (in the lower panel of the table) represent the sum of all coefficients from lead 6 to lag 6. The individual F-tests are exclusion restrictions for the six 
leads and lags of each regressor.  The Wald tests are for the null hypothesis that the sum of the six leads and lags is equal to zero.  
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Independent Varia$Bles
Constant -0.0008  -0.0003  0.0010   -0.0004  -0.0003  0.0007  
Japanese Intervention
leads  2-6 -0.0054  -0.0028  -0.0049   -0.0014  -0.0018  -0.0234  
lead  1 -0.0030  -0.0045  -0.0701 ** -0.0028  -0.0068  -0.0942 **
lag  0 -0.0084  -0.0004  -0.0357   -0.0206  0.0192  -0.0595 **
lag  1 0.0021  -0.0083 * -0.0441 * 0.0049  -0.0094 ** -0.0475 **
lags  2-6 0.0029  0.0027  -0.0441 ** -0.0009  0.0012  -0.0455 **
Lagged Dependent variable
lag  1 0.0730 *** 0.0163  0.0491   0.1052 *** 0.0154  0.0555  
lag  2 0.0723 *** 0.0054  0.1082 *** 0.0879 *** 0.0057  0.1167 ***
Macro Surprises
UK 0.0068  0.0059  0.0024   0.0068  0.0052  0.0002  
US -0.0103  0.0022  0.0090   -0.0108  0.0025  -0.0063  
Euro-zone -0.0006  0.0017  -0.0162   0.0148  0.0027  -0.0166  
















Oral Policy -0.2796 *** ** -0.0171 *** 1.5151 *** 0.0131 *** *** 0.0017 -0.0358 ***
Intervention 1.0991 *** -0.2042 *** 0.2584 *** -0.0763 *** *** -0.0360 0.0106 ***
No intervenion -0.8976 *** *** 0.0222 *** 0.2747 *** 0.0765 *** *** 0.0035 0.1191 ***
Japan
Oral Policy -2.5053 *** *** 0.0049 *** -0.6283 *** 0.0350 *** *** -0.0028 -0.1048 ***
Intervention 0.1362 *** 0.0588 *** 0.4517 *** -0.0363 *** *** -0.0117 -0.0558 ***
No intervenion … … … -0.0314 *** *** -0.0371 -0.0373 ***
UK
Intervention 0.1290 *** 0.0566 *** -0.7862 *** -0.2598 *** *** -0.0609 0.2572 ***
Joint
Intervention 0.1564 *** -0.0214 *** 0.5202 *** 0.3233 *** *** -0.0413 -0.0507 ***
No intervenion -0.3180 *** *** -0.0036 *** -0.9098 *** -0.2488 *** *** -0.0441 0.0804 ***
News about Market's Expectations
Euro-zone
Intervention -0.3286 *** 0.0250 *** 1.8344 *** -4.0615 *** *** -8.5049 -19.7749 ***
No intervenion -0.7514 *** 0.0811 *** 0.3384 *** *** 33.8263 *** *** 8.9223 -6.1190 ***
Japan
Intervention 0.0242 *** 0.0477 *** 0.6929 *** -0.0202 *** *** 0.0035 -0.0209 ***
Joint
Intervention 2.6037 *** -0.1261 *** 1.6604 *** 0.2984 *** *** 0.0025 -0.2385 ***
No intervenion -0.7002 *** 0.0035 *** -0.3037 *** *** -0.1168 *** *** -0.0125 0.0000 ***
News about Policymaker-Market Interactions
Euro-zone intervention denied … … -1.0636 *** -0.0997 *** *** … 0.0525 ***
Market detects Japan intervention 0.5193 *** *** 0.0233 *** 1.4374 *** -0.0407 *** *** -0.0151 0.1471 ***
News about Unrequited Interventions
Euro-zone
Unrequited actual intervention -0.0046 *** ** 0.0106 *** *** 0.0394 *** 0.0063 *** *** 0.0090 -0.0136 ***
Unrequited oral intervention … … -0.1560 *** -0.0384 *** *** -0.0116 -0.0563 ***
Japan
Unrequited actual intervention 0.1892 *** -0.0914 *** -0.8888 *** 0.0887 *** *** 0.0318 -0.0321 ***
Joint
Unrequited actual intervention -0.1281 *** 0.1267 *** 0.9163 *** -0.2688 *** *** 0.0766 0.1690 ***
Unrequited oral intervention -0.2781 *** -0.1580 *** -0.7987 *** 0.2649 *** *** 0.0016 -0.1750 ***
Rbar-squared 0.1083 0.0235 0.0611 0.0363 -0.0004 0.0168
F-test (all regressors) 8.82 *** 2.50 *** 5.29 *** 3.45 *** 0.98 2.11 ***
Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.  *, ** 
and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  Significance for the upper panel of the table is based on the t-statistic. Coefficients for each "news" regressor (in the lower panel of 
the table) represent the sum of all coefficients from lead 6 to lag 6. The individual F-tests are exclusion restrictions for the six leads and lags of each regressor.  The Wald tests are for the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the six leads and lags is equal to zero.
Table 6: The Influence of Intervention News on Returns in "High Volatility" and "High News Arrival" Periods
"High volatility" "High news arrival"
USD-EUR USD-G$BP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-G$BP YEN-USD
  35Independent Variables
Constant -0.0001  -0.0004   0.0000  0.0000   -0.0001   -0.0001  
Japanese Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0015   -0.0044   0.0072   0.0065   -0.0256   -0.0281  
lead 1 -0.0411 *** -0.0426 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0068   -0.0109  
lag 0 -0.0299 *** -0.0228   0.0093   0.0110   -0.0223 * -0.0352  
lag 1 -0.0255 *** -0.0266 ** -0.0164 ** -0.0147 ** -0.0130   -0.0125  
lags 2-6 -0.0171 *** -0.0163 ** -0.0049 * -0.0045 * -0.0094   -0.0076  
Lagged Dependent variable
lag 1 0.3191 *** 0.3126 *** 0.2232 *** 0.2214 *** 0.4385 *** 0.4339 ***
lag 2 0.1236 *** 0.1191 *** 0.1267 *** 0.1253 *** 0.0323   0.0299  
lag 3 0.1037 *** 0.1015 *** 0.0948 *** 0.0933 *** 0.0595 *** 0.0575 ***
lag 4 0.0794 *** 0.0791 *** 0.0858 *** 0.0880 *** 0.0275 * 0.0298 *
lag 5 0.0466 *** 0.0478 *** 0.0859 *** 0.0877 *** 0.0207   0.0216 *
lag 6 0.0467 *** 0.0496 *** 0.0685 *** 0.0698 *** 0.0456 *** 0.0468 ***
Macro Surprises
UK -0.0077  -0.0071   0.0000  -0.0001   -0.0036   -0.0042  
US 0.0079  0.0080   -0.0026  -0.0024   0.0168   0.0177  
Euro-zone 0.0042   0.0029  -0.0045   -0.0037  -0.0047   -0.0059  










Oral Policy -0.0223 *** 0.0036 *** -0.0274 ***
Intervention 0.0002 *** -0.0044 *** -0.0210 ***
No intervenion -0.0234 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0186 ***
Japan
Oral Policy -0.0216 *** -0.0071 *** * -0.0377 ***
Intervention -0.0130 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0038 ***
No intervenion 0.2939 *** 0.0057 *** * -0.1088 ***
UK
Oral Policy 0.0412 *** -0.0137 *** -0.0602 ***
Intervention 0.0321 *** 0.0082 *** ** 0.0082 ***
No intervenion 0.0500 *** 0.0000 *** *** 0.0290 ***
Joint
Intervention 0.0708 *** -0.0022 *** 0.0166 *** *
No intervenion 0.0209 *** 0.0027 *** -0.0215 ***
News about Market's Expectations
Euro-zone
Intervention 0.0834 *** 0.0181 *** 0.0753 ***
No intervenion -0.0176 *** -0.0101 *** 0.0032 ***
Japan
Intervention -0.0220 *** 0.0349 *** 0.2280 ***
Joint
Intervention -0.0184 *** ** -0.0004 *** 0.0110 ***
No intervenion -0.0320 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0035 ***
News about Policymaker-Market Interactions
Euro-zone intervention denied 0.0174 *** 0.0000 *** *** 0.3014 *** ***
Market detects Japan intervention -0.0134 *** -0.0015 *** 0.0002 ***
News about Unrequited Interventions
Euro-zone
Unrequited actual intervention 0.0007 *** 0.0033 *** -0.0116 ***
Unrequited oral intervention -0.0606 *** -0.0172 *** -0.0536 ***
Japan
Unrequited actual intervention 0.0228 *** -0.0004 *** 0.0029 ***
Joint
Unrequited actual intervention 0.0002 *** * -0.0049 *** -0.0208 ***
Unrequited oral intervention 0.0013 *** *** -0.0008 *** 0.0078 *** q _ g
Rbar-squared 0.2901 0.2910 0.2135 0.2131 0.2541 0.2548
F-test (all regressors) 360 *** 40 *** 209 *** 25 *** 296 *** 33 ***












Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of 
the bid and ask quotes.  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  Significance for the upper panel of the table is based on the t-statistic. 
Coefficients for each "news" regressor (in the lower panel of the table) represent the sum of all coefficients from lead 6 to lag 6. The individual F-tests are exclusion 
restrictions for the six leads and lags of each regressor.  The Wald tests are for the null hypothesis that the sum of the six leads and lags is equal to zero.
  36 
Independent Variables
Constant -0.0901  -0.1202   -0.1033  -0.0058   0.0238  0.0228  
Japanese Intervention
leads  2-6 -4.1961 *** -1.0888  -1.2462   -0.0416  -0.7591 *** -0.8314 ***
lead  1 -4.6617 ** -2.2000  -4.6529   -2.6797  -0.6516 *** -0.5112  
lag 0 -4.9106 ** 0.4313   -5.0647 ** -2.9112 * -0.7455 *** -0.5577  
lag 1 -4.8273 ** -2.6017   -6.4330 ** -4.9652 * -0.5991 *** -0.5347 **
lags 2-6 -5.4774 *** -5.3553 *** -4.4389 *** -3.4090 ** -0.5534 *** -0.6662 ***
Lagged Dependent variable
lag 1 0.7755 *** 0.7699 *** 0.6057 *** 0.6012 *** 0.4559 *** 0.4528 ***
lag 2 0.0427   0.0435   0.1520 *** 0.1499 *** 0.1610 *** 0.1637 ***
lag 3 0.0516 ** 0.0535 ** 0.1126 *** 0.1135 *** 0.0806 *** 0.0777 ***
lag  4 0.0286  0.0302   0.0003  0.0018   0.0471 *** 0.0464 ***
lag 5 0.0006   0.0022   -0.0130   -0.0119   0.0411 ** 0.0432 **
lag  6 -0.0202  -0.0228   -0.0082  -0.0075   0.0189  0.0183  
Macro Surprises
UK -0.7112  -0.4355   -3.4219  -3.3835   0.6023  0.6344  
US -3.2518  -3.1317   -8.1411  -7.4204   -0.1137  -0.0810  
Euro-zone 5.0465  4.3927   2.8137  4.0070   0.1512  0.1080  










Oral Policy -0.8451 *** 5.4976 *** -1.1338 *** *
Intervention -7.8173 *** 2.5021 *** 0.0237 ***
No intervenion -2.4841 *** -4.6132 *** -0.1862 ***
Japan
Oral Policy -9.5428 *** -13.8889 *** -3.2321 ***
Intervention -5.5828 *** -3.2929 *** 0.4353 ***
No intervenion -8.8341 *** -16.4646 *** -0.6557 ***
UK
Oral Policy -4.6169 *** -35.9528 *** -3.6353 ***
Intervention 21.2232 *** ** 24.4042 *** *** -0.7175 ***
No intervenion 62.0837 *** 0.0000 *** *** -2.5963 *** ***
Joint
Intervention -15.1287 *** -6.5957 *** 1.4204 ***
No intervenion -3.5515 *** 13.2230 *** -2.2718 *** *
News about Market's Expectations
Euro-zone
Intervention 0.2503 *** ** 15.9818 *** 0.1355 ***
No intervenion -17.6266 *** -14.3607 *** -1.3407 ***
Japan
Intervention -61.4805 *** *** -27.1369 *** -3.2594 ***
Joint
Intervention 2.2816 *** 0.9085 *** -0.4039 ***
No intervenion 10.1862 *** 30.3033 *** 7.9178 *** ***
News about Policymaker-Market Interactions
Euro-zone intervention denied -19.4562 *** 0.0000 *** *** 5.4402 *** ***
Market detects Japan intervention -1.1506 *** -8.5638 *** -0.9340 ***
News about Unrequited Interventions
Euro-zone
Unrequited actual intervention 14.9062 *** 2.2208 *** 0.7883 ***
Unrequited oral intervention -9.2145 *** -11.2818 *** -1.0867 ***
Japan
Unrequited actual intervention 7.5046 *** 4.4229 *** -0.2101 ***
Joint
Unrequited actual intervention -2.4655 *** -3.3131 *** 0.0766 ***
Unrequited oral intervention -3.8946 *** -5.5740 *** -0.6304 *** *
Rbar-squared 0.7444 0.7446 0.6529 0.6522 0.4814 0.4834
F-test (all regressors) 2557 *** 279 *** 1440 *** 170 *** 805 *** 89 ***












Notes: Transaction frequency is calculated as the number of transactions in any given 20 minute period.  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Significance 
for the upper panel of the table is based on the t-statistic. Coefficients for each "news" regressor (in the lower panel of the table) represent the sum of all coefficients from lead 6 to lag 6. 
The individual F-tests are exclusion restrictions for the six leads and lags of each regressor.  The Wald tests are for the null hypothesis that the sum of the six leads and lags is equal to 
zero.    
  37Independent Variables
Constant -0.0007  -0.0008 *** -0.0004
Lagged Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.1675 *** 0.0219   0.0569  
lag 2 0.1092 *** 0.0279 ** 0.1166 ***
Order Flow
Contemporaneous 0.0039 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0104 ***
lag1 -0.0010 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0008  
lags 2-6 0.0000   0.0000   -0.0003 **
Rbar-squared 0.0279 0.1429 0.0677
F-test (all regressors) 1310 *** 448 *** 221 ***
Table 9: The Influence of Order Flow on Returns
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency.  Returns are defined as 100 
times the log difference of the mid quote .The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and 
ask quotes.  Order flow is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade 
in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling 
for USD-GBP and US dollar for YEN-USD).  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent, respectively. Significance is based on the t-statistic.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Return on order flow
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Constant 0.2666  0.2759 ** 0.3996 *** 0.4634 *** 0.0506 * 0.0851 ***
Japanese Intervention
leads  2-6 -0.0745   -0.5618  0.8630   0.6523  0.2239 * 0.0924  
lead  1 -0.0506 ** 1.2326   -1.0250  -0.6853   0.0915  -0.1048  
lag 0 -0.2786 ** -0.5813   1.4212   1.9847   -0.0975 ** -0.1959  
lag 1 -0.2626 ** 0.0313   -0.6675   -0.6011   -0.0596 ** -0.1645  
lags 2-6 -0.2666 ** 0.0604   -0.5724 * -0.7803   -0.0506 * -0.0836  
Lagged Dependent variable
lag 1 0.0399   0.0379 ** 0.0407 ** 0.0370 ** 0.1448 *** 0.1405 ***
lag  2 -0.0202 *** -0.0237  0.0091   0.0068  0.0449 ** 0.0440 **
Macro Surprises
UK 3.0779  2.9382   2.7724   2.6714   -0.6831   -0.7494  
US -0.3832  -0.3064   1.7723   1.7367   -0.3029   -0.2943  
Euro-zone 2.1095   1.8050   -0.8338  -1.1205   -0.5074  -0.5557  










Oral Policy 5.6522 -0.9875 -0.1881 ***
Intervention 5.6845 * -5.2476 0.5707 ***
No intervenion -4.9886 0.9475 -0.6269 ***
Japan
Oral Policy -5.1987 1.6619 -0.8987 ***
Intervention 0.4738 -1.5611 0.3872 ***
No intervenion -6.2427 -13.4875 0.4510 ***
UK
Oral Policy -1.5977 6.1912 -8.3645 ***
Intervention 7.3140 -15.6653 ** 2.7784 ***
No intervenion -73.2060 *** 0.0000 -14.0207 *** **
Joint
Intervention -1.2165 6.2558 0.9641 ***
No intervenion 0.3160 2.0383 ** -1.8633 ***
News about Market's Expectations
Euro-zone
Intervention -3.6648 ** 2.1373 5.1265 ***
No intervenion -3.6073 -6.1506 -2.6148 ***
Japan
Intervention -0.9566 24.0111 ** -0.5457 ***
Joint
Intervention -3.3238 4.4762 -2.0084 ***
No intervenion -15.1552 ** -0.1322 1.0609 *** **
News about Policymaker-Market Interactions
Euro-zone intervention denied 3.2289 0.0000 -12.9331 *** ***
Market detects Japan intervention -1.0236 1.1837 -0.3967 ***
News about Unrequited Interventions
Euro-zone
Unrequited actual intervention 1.3072 -1.0556 -0.4556 *** *
Unrequited oral intervention -10.0007 5.7612 3.3315 ***
Japan
Unrequited actual intervention 2.5613 -0.6994 -0.3581 ***
Joint
Unrequited actual intervention 0.1258 -1.0981 1.0570 ***
Unrequited oral intervention 1.7268 -1.1626 -0.5606 ***
Rbar-squared 0.0014 0.0010 0.0016 0.0013 0.0244 0.0263
F-test (all regressors) 2.89 ** 1.11 2.86 ** 1.13 31.43 *** 3.63 ***












Notes: Order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency.  It is the net of the total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser 
(seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and US dollar for YEN-USD).  *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Significance for the upper panel of the table is based on the t-statistic. Coefficients for each "news" regressor (in the lower panel of the table) represent the sum of 
all coefficients from lead 6 to lag 6. The individual F-tests are exclusion restrictions for the six leads and lags of each regressor.  The Wald tests are for the null hypothesis that 
the sum of the six leads and lags is equal to zero.  
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